banner



Home  ›  How Was The Makeup Of The Senate Changed After The 17th Amendment

How Was The Makeup Of The Senate Changed After The 17th Amendment

Written By Sunday, June 5, 2022 Add Comment Edit

1913 amendment establishing the direct ballot of senators

The Seventeenth Amendment (Amendment XVII) to the United States Constitution established the direct election of United States senators in each country. The amendment supersedes Article I, §3, Clauses 1 andtwo of the Constitution, under which senators were elected by state legislatures. It also alters the process for filling vacancies in the Senate, allowing for state legislatures to permit their governors to make temporary appointments until a special election can exist held.

The amendment was proposed past the 62nd Congress in 1912 and became part of the Constitution on April 8, 1913, on ratification by 3-quarters (36) of the land legislatures. Sitting senators were non affected until their existing terms expired. The transition began with two special elections in Georgia[one] and Maryland, and so in earnest with the November 1914 election; it was complete on March 4, 1919, when the senators called at the November 1918 election took function.

Text [edit]

The Senate of the United states of america shall be composed of two Senators from each State, elected past the people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have one vote. The electors in each Country shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the Land legislatures.

When vacancies happen in the representation of any State in the Senate, the executive authority of such Country shall consequence writs of ballot to fill such vacancies: Provided, That the legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof to brand temporary appointments until the people fill the vacancies by election equally the legislature may directly.

This amendment shall not be so construed as to affect the election or term of any Senator chosen before it becomes valid as part of the Constitution.[2]

Groundwork [edit]

Original composition [edit]

Originally, nether Article I, § 3, Clauses 1 and2 of the Constitution, each state legislature elected its state's senators for a half-dozen-year term.[iii] Each state, regardless of size, is entitled to 2 senators as function of the Connecticut Compromise betwixt the pocket-sized and large states.[iv] This contrasted with the House of Representatives, a trunk elected past popular vote, and was described as an uncontroversial decision; at the time, James Wilson was the sole advocate of popularly electing the Senate, but his proposal was defeated x–i.[5] There were many advantages to the original method of electing senators. Prior to the Constitution, a federal body was one where states effectively formed nothing more than permanent treaties, with citizens retaining their loyalty to their original land. Notwithstanding, under the new Constitution, the federal regime was granted substantially more power than before. Having the state legislatures elect the senators reassured anti-federalists that there would be some protection confronting the federal regime'due south swallowing up states and their powers,[six] and providing a bank check on the power of the federal government.[7]

Additionally, the longer terms and avoidance of popular ballot turned the Senate into a trunk that could counter the populism of the Business firm. While the representatives operated in a 2-yr direct election bike, making them oftentimes accountable to their constituents, the senators could beget to "have a more detached view of issues coming before Congress".[8] State legislatures retained the theoretical right to "instruct" their senators to vote for or against proposals, thus giving the states both direct and indirect representation in the federal government.[nine] The Senate was part of a formal bicameralism, with the members of the Senate and House responsible to completely distinct constituencies; this helped defeat the problem of the federal regime being field of study to "special interests".[ten] Members of the Ramble Convention considered the Senate to exist parallel to the British House of Lords as an "upper house", containing the "meliorate men" of society, merely improved upon every bit they would be conscientiously chosen by the upper houses of country legislatures for fixed terms, and not merely inherited for life as in the British organisation, subject to a monarch's arbitrary expansion. It was hoped they would provide abler deliberation and greater stability than the House of Representatives due to the senators' status.[11]

Issues [edit]

According to Gauge Jay Bybee of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, those in favor of popular elections for senators believed two primary problems were caused by the original provisions: legislative corruption and electoral deadlocks.[12] There was a sense that senatorial elections were "bought and sold", irresolute easily for favors and sums of money rather than considering of the competence of the candidate. Between 1857 and 1900, the Senate investigated iii elections over corruption. In 1900, for example, William A. Clark had his election voided after the Senate concluded that he had bought votes in the Montana legislature. But analysts Bybee and Todd Zywicki believe this concern was largely unfounded; there was a "dearth of hard data" on the subject field.[13] In more than a century of legislative elections of U.S. senators, simply ten cases were contested for allegations of impropriety.[14]

Electoral deadlocks were another issue. Because state legislatures were charged with deciding whom to engage as senators, the system relied on their ability to hold. Some states could not, and thus delayed sending senators to Congress; in a few cases, the system bankrupt down to the point where states completely lacked representation in the Senate.[xv] Deadlocks started to become an issue in the 1850s, with a deadlocked Indiana legislature assuasive a Senate seat to sit down vacant for two years.[16] The tipping point came in 1865 with the election of John P. Stockton (D-NJ), which happened after the New Jersey legislature changed its rules regarding the definition of a quorum and was thus elected past plurality instead of past absolute majority.[17]

In 1866, Congress acted to standardize a ii-step process for Senate elections.[18] In the first step, each bedchamber of the state legislature would meet separately to vote. The post-obit day, the chambers would encounter in "joint assembly" to assess the results, and if a majority in both chambers had voted for the same person, he would be elected. If not, the joint associates would vote for a senator, with each fellow member receiving a vote. If no person received a bulk, the joint associates was required to keep convening every day to take at least i vote until a senator was elected.[19] Nevertheless, between 1891 and 1905, 46 elections were deadlocked across 20 states;[14] in one extreme instance, a Senate seat for Delaware went unfilled from 1899 until 1903.[twenty] The business of holding elections too caused groovy disruption in the state legislatures, with a full third of the Oregon Business firm of Representatives choosing not to swear the oath of function in 1897 due to a dispute over an open Senate seat. The result was that Oregon's legislature was unable to pass legislation that year.[20]

Zywicki again argues that this was not a serious issue. Deadlocks were a problem, but they were the exception rather than the norm; many legislatures did non deadlock over elections at all. Most of those that did in the 19th century were the newly admitted western states, which suffered from "inexperienced legislatures and weak party subject field... as western legislatures gained experience, deadlocks became less frequent." While Utah suffered from deadlocks in 1897 and 1899, they became what Zywicki refers to every bit "a skillful instruction feel", and Utah never again failed to elect senators.[21] Some other business organisation was that when deadlocks occurred, country legislatures were unable to bear their other normal business; James Christian Ure, writing in the South Texas Police force Review, notes that this did not in fact occur. In a deadlock situation, country legislatures would deal with the thing by property "one vote at the beginning of the day—then the legislators would continue with their normal affairs".[22]

Eventually, legislative elections held in a state'southward Senate election years were perceived to have become so dominated by the business organization of picking senators that the land'south choice for senator distracted the electorate from all other pertinent issues.[23] Senator John H. Mitchell noted that the Senate became the "vital issue" in all legislative campaigns, with the policy stances and qualifications of state legislative candidates ignored by voters who were more than interested in the indirect Senate election.[24] To remedy this, some land legislatures created "informational elections" that served every bit de facto general elections, allowing legislative campaigns to focus on local bug.[24]

Calls for reform [edit]

Calls for a constitutional amendment regarding Senate elections started in the early 19th century, with Henry R. Storrs in 1826 proposing an amendment to provide for popular election.[25] Like amendments were introduced in 1829 and 1855, with the "about prominent" proponent being Andrew Johnson, who raised the issue in 1868 and considered the idea's claim "so palpable" that no additional explanation was necessary.[26] As noted above, in the 1860s, there was a major congressional dispute over the issue, with the Business firm and Senate voting to veto the appointment of John P. Stockton to the Senate due to his approval by a plurality of the New Jersey Legislature rather than a majority. In reaction, the Congress passed a pecker in July 1866 that required country legislatures to elect senators past an absolute majority.[26]

Past the 1890s, support for the introduction of direct election for the Senate had substantially increased, and reformers worked on two fronts. On the first front, the Populist Party incorporated the direct ballot of senators into its Omaha Platform, adopted in 1892.[27] In 1908, Oregon passed the beginning law basing the pick of U.S. senators on a popular vote. Oregon was before long followed by Nebraska.[28] Proponents for popular election noted that ten states already had non-binding primaries for Senate candidates,[29] in which the candidates would be voted on past the public, effectively serving as advisory referenda instructing state legislatures how to vote;[29] reformers campaigned for more states to introduce a similar method.

William Randolph Hearst opened a nationwide popular readership for direct election of U.Due south. senators in a 1906 serial of articles using flamboyant language attacking "The Treason of the Senate" in his Cosmopolitan magazine. David Graham Philips, one of the "yellow journalists" whom President Teddy Roosevelt called "muckrakers", described Nelson Aldrich of Rhode Island every bit the principal "traitor" among the "scurvy lot" in control of the Senate by theft, perjury, and bribes corrupting the state legislatures to proceeds election to the Senate. A few state legislatures began to petition the Congress for straight ballot of senators. By 1893, the Business firm had the two-thirds vote for only such an amendment. Nonetheless, when the articulation resolution reached the Senate, it failed from neglect, as information technology did over again in 1900, 1904 and 1908; each time the House approved the advisable resolution, and each time it died in the Senate.[30]

On the 2d national legislative front, reformers worked toward a constitutional amendment, which was strongly supported in the House of Representatives but initially opposed by the Senate. Bybee notes that the land legislatures, which would lose power if the reforms went through, were supportive of the campaign. By 1910, 31 state legislatures had passed resolutions calling for a constitutional amendment allowing straight ballot, and in the aforementioned year 10 Republican senators who were opposed to reform were forced out of their seats, interim as a "wake-up phone call to the Senate".[29]

Reformers included William Jennings Bryan, while opponents counted respected figures such as Elihu Root and George Frisbie Hoar among their number; Root cared so strongly near the issue that later the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment he refused to stand up for re‑election to the Senate.[12] Bryan and the reformers argued for popular election through highlighting flaws they saw within the existing system, specifically corruption and electoral deadlocks, and through arousing populist sentiment. Most important was the populist statement; that there was a need to "Awaken, in the senators... a more acute sense of responsibleness to the people", which it was felt they lacked; election through state legislatures was seen as an anachronism that was out of footstep with the wishes of the American people, and one that had led to the Senate becoming "a sort of aristocratic body—too far removed from the people, beyond their reach, and with no special interest in their welfare".[31] The settlement of the Due west and continuing assimilation of hundreds of thousands of immigrants expanded the sense of "the people".

Hoar replied that "the people" were both a less permanent and a less trusted body than country legislatures, and moving the responsibility for the election of senators to them would meet it passing into the hands of a body that "[lasted] but a day" before changing. Other counterarguments were that renowned senators could non take been elected straight and that, since a big number of senators had feel in the Business firm (which was already straight elected), a constitutional amendment would be pointless.[32] The reform was considered by opponents to threaten the rights and independence of the states, who were "sovereign, entitled... to take a separate branch of Congress... to which they could transport their ambassadors." This was countered by the argument that a alter in the style in which senators were elected would not change their responsibilities.[33]

The Senate freshman class of 1910 brought new hope to the reformers. Xiv of the thirty newly elected senators had been elected through political party primaries, which amounted to pop choice in their states. More than than half of the states had some form of primary selection for the Senate. The Senate finally joined the House to submit the Seventeenth Subpoena to the states for ratification, nearly ninety years after it beginning was presented to the Senate in 1826.[34]

Past 1912, 239 political parties at both the land and national level had pledged some class of direct election, and 33 states had introduced the utilise of directly primaries.[35] Twenty-seven states had chosen for a constitutional convention on the subject area, with 31 states needed to reach the threshold; Arizona and New Mexico each accomplished statehood that year (bringing the total number of states to 48), and were expected to support the move. Alabama and Wyoming, already states, had passed resolutions in favor of a convention without formally calling for one.[36]

Proposal and ratification [edit]

Proposal in Congress [edit]

In 1911, the Firm of Representatives passed Firm Articulation Resolution 39 proposing a constitutional amendment for directly election of senators. The original resolution passed by the House contained the following clause:[37]

The times, places, and manner of holding elections for Senators shall be equally prescribed in each State by the legislature thereof.

This so-called "race rider" clause would have strengthened the powers of states over senatorial elections and weakened those of Congress by overriding Congress'south power to override state laws affecting the way of senatorial elections.[38]

Since the turn of the century, most blacks in the S, and many poor whites, had been disenfranchised by state legislatures passing constitutions with provisions that were discriminatory in practice. This meant that their millions of population had no political representation. Most of the South had one-political party states. When the resolution came before the Senate, a substitute resolution, i without the rider, was proposed by Joseph 50. Bristow of Kansas. It was adopted by a vote of 64 to 24, with four not voting.[39] Nearly a year later, the House accepted the alter. The conference report that would go the Seventeenth Amendment was canonical by the Senate 42 to 36 on April 12, 1912, and by the House 238 to 39, with 110 non voting on May xiii, 1912.

Ratification by usa [edit]

 Original ratifier of amendment

 Ratified after adoption

 Rejected amendment

 No activeness taken on amendment

Having been passed by Congress, the amendment was sent to the states for ratification and was ratified by:[forty]

  1. Massachusetts: May 22, 1912
  2. Arizona: June three, 1912
  3. Minnesota: June 10, 1912
  4. New York: January 15, 1913
  5. Kansas: January 17, 1913
  6. Oregon: January 23, 1913
  7. North Carolina: January 25, 1913
  8. California: January 28, 1913
  9. Michigan: January 28, 1913
  10. Iowa: January xxx, 1913
  11. Montana: January 30, 1913
  12. Idaho: January 31, 1913
  13. Due west Virginia: February iv, 1913
  14. Colorado: February 5, 1913
  15. Nevada: Feb 6, 1913
  16. Texas: Feb 7, 1913
  17. Washington: Feb 7, 1913
  18. Wyoming: Feb viii, 1913
  19. Arkansas: February 11, 1913
  20. Maine: Feb eleven, 1913
  21. Illinois: Feb 13, 1913
  22. North Dakota: February 14, 1913
  23. Wisconsin: February eighteen, 1913
  24. Indiana: Feb xix, 1913
  25. New Hampshire: February 19, 1913
  26. Vermont: Feb xix, 1913
  27. Southward Dakota: Feb nineteen, 1913
  28. Oklahoma: February 24, 1913
  29. Ohio: February 25, 1913
  30. Missouri: March 7, 1913
  31. New Mexico: March xiii, 1913
  32. Nebraska: March 14, 1913
  33. New Jersey: March 17, 1913
  34. Tennessee: April one, 1913
  35. Pennsylvania: April 2, 1913
  36. Connecticut: April 8, 1913
    With 36 states having ratified the Seventeenth Amendment, it was certified by Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan on May 31, 1913, as role of the Constitution.[xl] The subpoena has subsequently been ratified by:
  37. Louisiana: June 11, 1914
  38. Alabama: April 11, 2002[41]
  39. Delaware: July 1, 2010[42] (afterward rejecting the amendment on March 18, 1913)
  40. Maryland: April ane, 2012[43] [44] [45]
  41. Rhode Island: June 20, 2014

The Utah legislature rejected the amendment on February 26, 1913. No activeness on the amendment has been completed past Florida,[46] Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, South Carolina, Virginia, Alaska or Hawaii. Alaska and Hawaii were not yet states at the time of the amendment's proposal, and take never taken any official activeness to support or oppose the amendment since achieving statehood.

Effect [edit]

Most importantly, the Seventeenth Amendment removed land government representation from the legislative arm of the federal regime. Originally, the people themselves did non elect Senators; instead, states appointed Senators. The Senators represented united states of america' interests, while the Firm of Representatives represented the interests of the people.

The Seventeenth Amendment altered the procedure for electing United States senators and changed the manner vacancies would exist filled. Originally, the Constitution required state legislatures to make full Senate vacancies.

Co-ordinate to Estimate Bybee, the Seventeenth Amendment had a dramatic impact on the political composition of the U.South. Senate.[47] Before the Supreme Court required "one man, one vote" in Reynolds v. Sims (1964), malapportionment of state legislatures was mutual. For example, rural counties and cities could be given "equal weight" in the state legislatures, enabling one rural vote to equal 200 urban center votes. The malapportioned state legislatures would have given the Republicans command of the Senate in the 1916 Senate elections. With straight election, each vote represented equally, and the Democrats retained control of the Senate.[48]

The reputation of corrupt and capricious land legislatures continued to decline as the Senate joined the House of Representatives implementing popular reforms. Bybee has argued that the amendment led to complete "ignominy" for state legislatures without the buttress of a state-based bank check on Congress. In the decades following the Seventeenth Amendment, the federal government was enabled to enact progressive measures.[49] However, Schleiches argues that the separation of land legislatures and the Senate had a beneficial effect on the states, every bit it led state legislative campaigns to focus on local rather than national issues.[24]

New Deal legislation is another case of expanding federal regulation overruling the state legislatures promoting their local state interests in coal, oil, corn and cotton.[50] Ure agrees, saying that not just is each senator now free to ignore his state's interests, senators "have incentive to use their advice-and-consent powers to install Supreme Court justices who are inclined to increase federal ability at the expense of state sovereignty".[51] Over the first one-half of the 20th century, with a popularly elected Senate confirming nominations, both Republican and Autonomous, the Supreme Court began to apply the Beak of Rights to the states, overturning land laws whenever they harmed private state citizens.[52] It aimed to limit the influence of the wealthy.[53]

Filling vacancies [edit]

The Seventeenth Amendment requires a governor to phone call a special ballot to fill vacancies in the Senate.[54] It also allows a state'southward legislature to permit its governor to brand temporary appointments, which last until a special election is held to fill the vacancy. Currently, all only five states (North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin) permit such appointments.[55] The Constitution does not set out how the temporary appointee is to be selected.

Outset direct elections to the Senate [edit]

Oklahoma, admitted to statehood in 1907, chose a senator by legislative election three times: twice in 1907, when admitted, and once in 1908. In 1912, Oklahoma reelected Robert Owen past advisory popular vote.[56]

Oregon held primaries in 1908 in which the parties would run candidates for that position, and the state legislature pledged to cull the winner as the new senator.[57]

New Mexico, admitted to statehood in 1912, chose merely its commencement two senators legislatively. Arizona, admitted to statehood in 1912, chose its first two senators by advisory popular vote. Alaska, and Hawaii, admitted to statehood in 1959, have never chosen a U.S. senator legislatively.[56]

The beginning ballot discipline to the Seventeenth Amendment was a late election in Georgia held June 15, 1913. Augustus Octavius Bacon was however unopposed.

The get-go direct elections to the Senate following the Seventeenth Amendment being adopted were:[56]

  • In Maryland on November 4, 1913: a class ane special election due to a vacancy, for a term ending in 1917.
  • In Alabama on May 11, 1914: a class 3 special ballot due to a vacancy, for a term catastrophe in 1915.
  • Nationwide in 1914: All 32 class three senators, term 1915–1921
  • Nationwide in 1916: All 32 form ane senators, term 1917–1923
  • Nationwide in 1918: All 32 course 2 senators, term 1919–1925

Court cases and interpretation controversies [edit]

In Trinsey v. Pennsylvania (1991),[58] the United States Courtroom of Appeals for the Tertiary Circuit was faced with a situation where, post-obit the death of Senator John Heinz of Pennsylvania, Governor Bob Casey had provided for a replacement and for a special ballot that did non include a primary.[59] A voter and prospective candidate, John S. Trinsey Jr., argued that the lack of a primary violated the Seventeenth Subpoena and his right to vote under the Fourteenth Subpoena.[60] The 3rd Circuit rejected these arguments, ruling that the Seventeenth Amendment does not crave primaries.[61]

Some other discipline of assay is whether statutes restricting the authority of governors to appoint temporary replacements are constitutional. Vikram Amar, writing in the Hastings Ramble Law Quarterly, claims Wyoming's requirement that its governor fill a senatorial vacancy past nominating a person of the aforementioned party as the person who vacated that seat violates the Seventeenth Subpoena.[62] This is based on the text of the Seventeenth Amendment, which states that "the legislature of whatsoever land may empower the executive thereof to make temporary appointments". The subpoena only empowers the legislature to delegate the authority to the governor and, once that authority has been delegated, does not permit the legislature to arbitrate. The say-so is to decide whether the governor shall have the power to engage temporary senators, not whom the governor may appoint.[63] Sanford Levinson, in his rebuttal to Amar, argues that rather than engaging in a textual estimation, those examining the significant of ramble provisions should interpret them in the fashion that provides the most benefit, and that legislatures' being able to restrict gubernatorial engagement authority provides a substantial benefit to u.s..[64]

Reform and repeal efforts [edit]

Yet controversies over the effects of the Seventeenth Subpoena, advocates take emerged to reform or repeal the amendment. Under President Barack Obama'south administration in 2009, four sitting Autonomous senators left the Senate for executive co-operative positions: Barack Obama (President), Joe Biden (Vice President), Hillary Clinton (Secretary of State), and Ken Salazar (Secretary of the Interior). Controversies adult about the successor appointments made by Illinois governor Rod Blagojevich and New York governor David Paterson. New interest was aroused in abolishing the provision for the Senate appointment by the governor.[65] Appropriately, Senator Russ Feingold of Wisconsin[66] and Representative David Dreier of California proposed an amendment to remove this ability; senators John McCain and Dick Durbin became co-sponsors, as did Representative John Conyers.[65]

Some members of the Tea Political party movement argued for repealing the Seventeenth Amendment entirely, claiming it would protect states' rights and reduce the power of the federal government.[67] On March ii, 2016, the Utah legislature approved Senate Joint Resolution No.2 request Congress to offer an subpoena to the United States Constitution that would repeal the Seventeenth Amendment.[68] As of 2010[update], no other states had supported such an amendment, and some politicians who had made statements in favor of repealing the amendment had subsequently reversed their position on this.[67]

On July 28, 2017, after Senators John McCain, Susan Collins and Lisa Murkowski voted no on Affordable Intendance Deed repeal attempt Wellness Care Freedom Act, former Arkansas Governor Mike Huckabee endorsed the repeal on the Seventeenth Amendment, claiming that Senators chosen past state legislatures will work for their states and respect the Tenth Amendment,[69] and likewise that straight ballot of Senators is a major crusade of the "swamp".[seventy]

In September 2020, Senator Ben Sasse of Nebraska endorsed the repeal of the Seventeenth Amendment in a Wall Street Journal opinion slice.[71]

References [edit]

  1. ^ "Bacon, Augustus Octavius (1839–1914)". Biographical Directory of the U.S. Congress. Archived from the original on February 24, 2020. Retrieved February 24, 2020. became the kickoff U.Due south. Senator elected by popular vote post-obit ratification of the 17th Subpoena, on July 15, 1913
  2. ^ "The Constitution of the United States Amendments 11–27". National Archives and Records Assistants. Archived from the original on June 11, 2013. Retrieved January 7, 2011.
  3. ^ Zywicki (1997) p. 169
  4. ^ Vile (2003) p. 404
  5. ^ Zywicki (1994) p. 1013
  6. ^ Riker (1955) p. 452
  7. ^ Bybee 1997, p. 516.
  8. ^ Bybee 1997, p. 515.
  9. ^ Zywicki (1994) p. 1019
  10. ^ Zywicki (1997) p. 176
  11. ^ Zywicki (1997) p. 180
  12. ^ a b Bybee (1997) p. 538
  13. ^ Bybee 1997, p. 539.
  14. ^ a b Zywicki (1994) p. 1022
  15. ^ Bybee 1997, p. 541.
  16. ^ "Direct Ballot of Senators". United States Senate. Archived from the original on Dec 6, 2017. Retrieved June 26, 2014.
  17. ^ Schiller et al. (July 2013) p. 836
  18. ^ An Human activity to regulate the Times and Manner of holding Elections for Senators in Congress, July 25, 1866, ch. 245, xiv Stat. 243.
  19. ^ Schiller et al. (July 2013) pp. 836–37
  20. ^ a b Bybee (1997) p. 542
  21. ^ Zywicki (1994) p. 1024
  22. ^ Ure (2007) p. 286
  23. ^ Bybee 1997, p. 543.
  24. ^ a b c Schleicher, David (February 27, 2014). "States' Wrongs". Slate. Archived from the original on Oct xv, 2014. Retrieved October 9, 2014.
  25. ^ Stathis, Stephen W. (2009). Landmark debates in Congress: from the Annunciation of independence to the state of war in Iraq. CQ Press. p. 253. ISBN978-0-87289-976-6. OCLC 232129877.
  26. ^ a b Bybee 1997, p. 536.
  27. ^ Boyer, Paul S.; Dubofsky, Melvyn (2001). The Oxford companion to United States history . Oxford University Press. p. 612. ISBN978-0-19-508209-8. OCLC 185508759.
  28. ^ "Direct Ballot of Senators" Archived December 6, 2017, at the Wayback Machine, United States Senate webpage, Origins and Development—Institutional.
  29. ^ a b c Bybee (1997) p. 537
  30. ^ MacNeil, Neil and Richard A. Bakery, The American Senate: An Insider's History 2013, ISBN 978-0-19-536761-four. pp. 22–23.
  31. ^ Bybee 1997, p. 544.
  32. ^ Bybee 1997, p. 545.
  33. ^ Bybee 1997, p. 546.
  34. ^ MacNeil, Neil and Richard A. Baker, The American Senate: An Insider's History 2013, ISBN 978-0-xix-536761-four. p. 23.
  35. ^ Rossum (1999) p. 708
  36. ^ Rossum (1999) p. 710
  37. ^ "17th Amendment: Straight Ballot of U.S. Senators". August fifteen, 2016. Archived from the original on April 4, 2017. Retrieved Apr three, 2017.
  38. ^ Zachary Clopton & Steven Due east. Art, "The Meaning of the Seventeenth Amendment and a Century of Country Disobedience" Archived April iv, 2017, at the Wayback Machine, 107 Northwestern University Law Review 1181 (2013), pp. 1191–1192
  39. ^ "17th Subpoena to the U.S. Constitution: Directly Ballot of U.S. Senators". Baronial xv, 2016. Archived from the original on April 28, 2017. Retrieved April 3, 2017.
  40. ^ a b James J. Kilpatrick, ed. (1961). The Constitution of the United States and Amendments Thereto. Virginia Commission on Ramble Government. p. 49.
  41. ^ POM-309 Archived January xv, 2013, at the Wayback Motorcar, House Joint Resolution No. 12, A joint resolution adopted by the Legislature of the Land of Alabama relative to ratifying the Seventeenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Book 148 Congressional Record page 18241 (permanent, leap edition) and page S9419 (preliminary, soft-encompass edition). September 26, 2002. Retrieved May 10, 2012.[ chronology commendation needed ]
  42. ^ "Formally Ratifying the 17th Amendment to the Constitution of the The states Providing for the Popular Ballot of Senators to the United states Senate". Land of Delaware. Archived from the original on February ten, 2015. Retrieved February 9, 2015.
  43. ^ Senate Joint Resolution ii, April i, 2012, archived from the original on December 14, 2013, retrieved April 29, 2012
  44. ^ House Joint Resolution three, April i, 2012, archived from the original on December 14, 2013, retrieved Apr 29, 2012
  45. ^ Bills signing May 22, 2012 (PDF), May 22, 2012, archived from the original (PDF) on Jan 15, 2013, retrieved May 23, 2012
  46. ^ At the time, Article Sixteen, Section 19, of the Florida Constitution provided that "No Convention nor Legislature of this State shall act upon any amendment of the Constitution of the United States proposed past Congress to the several States, unless such Convention or Legislature shall take been elected afterward such subpoena is submitted." The first legislature elected subsequently such submission did not meet until April 5, 1913. See Fla. Const. of 1885, Art. III, § 2. By that time, the subpoena had been ratified by 35 states, and, as noted above, would exist ratified by the 36th state on April 8, 1913, a circumstance which made whatsoever action past the Florida Legislature unnecessary.
  47. ^ Bybee 1997, p. 552.
  48. ^ Bybee 1997, p. 552. Similarly, he believes the Republican Revolution of 1994 would not accept happened; instead, the Democrats would have controlled 70 seats in the Senate to the Republicans' 30. See Bybee 1997, p. 553
  49. ^ Bybee 1997, p. 535. This was partially fueled by the senators; he wrote in the Northwestern University Police force Review:

    Politics, like nature, abhorred a vacuum, so senators felt the force per unit area to practice something, namely enact laws. In one case senators were no longer accountable to and constrained by state legislatures, the maximizing office for senators was unrestrained; senators almost always institute in their own interest to procure federal legislation, fifty-fifty to the detriment of state control of traditional state functions.

    See Bybee 1997, p. 536.
  50. ^ Rossum (1999) p. 715
  51. ^ Ure (2007) p. 288
  52. ^ Kochan (2003) p. 1053 Donald J. Kochan, for an article in the Albany Police force Review, analyzed the effect of the Seventeenth Subpoena on Supreme Court decisions over the constitutionality of state legislation. He institute a "statistically significant difference" in the number of cases holding country legislation unconstitutional earlier and after the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment, with the number of holdings of unconstitutionality increasing sixfold. Besides the Seventeenth Subpoena, decline in the influence of the states also followed economic changes. Zywicki observes that interest groups of all kinds began to focus efforts on the federal regime, as national problems could not be directed by influencing only a few state legislatures of with senators of the most seniority chairing the major committees. He attributes the rise in the force of interest groups partially to the development of the U.South. economic system on an interstate, national level. See Zywicki (1997) p. 215. Ure also argues that the Seventeenth Amendment led to the ascent of special involvement groups to fill the void; with citizens replacing state legislators as the Senate'due south electorate, with citizens existence less able to monitor the actions of their senators, the Senate became more susceptible to pressure from interest groups, who in turn were more than influential due to the centralization of power in the federal government; an involvement group no longer needed to lobby many state legislatures, and could instead focus its efforts on the federal government. See Ure (2007) p. 293
  53. ^ "Money Talks; Don't Discount the Fatty Cats". Retrieved February xiii, 2021.
  54. ^ Vile (2010) p. 197
  55. ^ Neale, Thomas H. (Apr 12, 2018). "U.S. Senate Vacancies: Contemporary Developments and Perspectives" (PDF). fas.org. Congressional Research Service. Archived (PDF) from the original on June 5, 2018. Retrieved October 13, 2018.
  56. ^ a b c Dubin, Michael J. (1998). United states of america Congressional elections, 1788–1997: the official results of the elections of the 1st through 105th Congresses. Jefferson, NC: McFarland. ISBN0-7864-0283-0.
  57. ^ "Speech to the People of Washington by Senator Jonathan Bourne Jr. of Oregon, n.d." U.S. Capitol Company Center . Retrieved March 22, 2022.
  58. ^ Trinsey v. Pennsylvania , 941 (F.2d 1991).
  59. ^ Gold (1992) p. 202
  60. ^ Novakovic (1992) p. 940
  61. ^ Novakovic (1992) p. 945
  62. ^ Amar (2008) p. 728
  63. ^ Amar (2008) pp. 729–30
  64. ^ Levinson (2008) pp. 718–9
  65. ^ a b Hulse, Carl (March x, 2009). "New Idea on Capitol Hill: To Join Senate, Become Votes". The New York Times. Archived from the original on August thirty, 2011. Retrieved September 19, 2011.
  66. ^ S.J.Res.7—A joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States relative to the ballot of Senators., archived from the original on June 15, 2014, retrieved June 15, 2014
  67. ^ a b Firestone, David (May 31, 2010). "And so Yous Still Want to Choose Your Senator?". New York Times. Archived from the original on January 13, 2012. Retrieved September 19, 2011.
  68. ^ "SJR002". State of Utah. Archived from the original on March 29, 2016. Retrieved March 22, 2016.
  69. ^ "Archived copy". Archived from the original on Oct four, 2020. Retrieved September 27, 2020. {{cite spider web}}: CS1 maint: archived copy as title (link)
  70. ^ "Archived copy". Archived from the original on November 25, 2020. Retrieved September 27, 2020. {{cite web}}: CS1 maint: archived copy as championship (link)
  71. ^ "Ben Sasse Calls for Repealing 17th Amendment, Eliminating Popular-Vote Senate Elections". National Review. September 9, 2020. Archived from the original on September 28, 2020. Retrieved September 22, 2020.

Bibliography [edit]

  • Amar, Vikram David (2008). "Are Statutes Constraining Gubernatorial Ability to Brand Temporary Appointments to the U.s. Senate Constitutional Under the Seventeenth Amendment?". Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly. Academy of California, Hastings College of the Law. 35 (4). ISSN 0094-5617. SSRN 1103590.
  • Bybee, Jay S. (1997). "Ulysses at the Mast: Democracy, Federalism, and the Sirens' Song of the Seventeenth Amendment". Northwestern Academy Police force Review. Northwestern Academy Schoolhouse of Police. 91 (1). ISSN 0029-3571.
  • Gold, Kevin Thousand. (1992). "Trinsey v. Pennsylvania: State Discretion to Regulate United States Senate Vacancy". Widener Journal of Police force and Public Policy. Widener University School of Law. 2 (i). ISSN 1064-5012.
  • Haynes, George Henry (1912). Ringwalt, Ralph Curtis (ed.). The Election of Senators. H. Holt.
  • Hoebeke, Christopher Hyde (1995). The road to mass commonwealth: original intent and the Seventeenth Subpoena. Transaction Publishers. ISBNone-56000-217-four.
  • Kochan, Donald J. (2003). "State Laws and the Independent Judiciary: An Analysis of the Effects of the Seventeenth Amendment on the Number of Supreme Court Cases Holding State Laws Unconstitutional". Albany Law Review. 66 (one). ISSN 0002-4678. SSRN 907518.
  • Levinson, Sanford (2008). "Political Political party and Senatorial Succession: A Response to Vikram Amar on How Best to Translate the Seventeenth Amendment". Hastings Ramble Law Quarterly. Academy of California, Hastings Higher of the Law. 35 (4). ISSN 0094-5617.
  • Novakovic, Michael B. (1992). "Ramble Police: Filling Senate Vacancies". Villanova Law Review. Villanova Academy School of Law. 37 (one). ISSN 0042-6229.
  • Riker, William H. (1955). "The Senate and American Federalism". American Political Science Review. American Political Science Association. 49 (2). doi:10.2307/1951814. ISSN 0003-0554. JSTOR 1951814.
  • Rossum, Ralph A. (1999). "The Irony of Constitutional Republic: Federalism, the Supreme Court, and the Seventeenth Amendment". San Diego Law Review. University of San Diego School of Law. 36 (iii). ISSN 0886-3210.
  • Tushnet, Mark (2010). The Constitution of the U.s. of America: A Contextual Analysis. Hart Publishing. ISBN978-1-84113-738-iv.
  • Ure, James Christian (2007). "You Scratch My Back and I'll Scratch Yours: Why the Federal Marriage Amendment Should Also Repeal the Seventeenth Amendment". Southward Texas Law Review. S Texas Higher of Law. 49 (1). ISSN 1052-343X.
  • Vile, John R. (2003). Encyclopedia of constitutional amendments, proposed amendments, and amending problems, 1789–2002 (2nd ed.). ABC-CLIO. ISBN978-i-85109-428-8.
  • Vile, John R. (2010). A companion to the United states of america Constitution and its amendments (5th ed.). ABC-CLIO. ISBN978-0-313-38008-ii.
  • Zywicki, Todd J. (1994). "Senators and Special Interests: A Public Choice Analysis of the Seventeenth Amendment" (PDF). Oregon Law Review. Academy of Oregon School of Law. 73 (1). ISSN 0196-2043.
  • Zywicki, Todd J. (1997). "Beyond the Beat out and Husk of History: The History of the Seventeenth Subpoena and its Implications for Electric current Reform Proposals" (PDF). Cleveland Land Law Review. Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. 45 (1). ISSN 0009-8876.
  • Wendy J. Schiller and Charles Stewart 3 (May 2013), The 100th Anniversary of the 17th Amendment: A Promise Unfulfilled?, Bug in Governance Studies, Number 59 May 2013
  • Schiller, Wendy J.; Stewart, Charles; Xiong, Benjamin (July 2013). "U.S. Senate Elections before the 17th Amendment: Political Political party Cohesion and Conflict 1871–1913". The Journal of Politics. 75 (3): 835–847. doi:10.1017/S0022381613000479.

External links [edit]

Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seventeenth_Amendment_to_the_United_States_Constitution

Posted by: blackcomentse.blogspot.com

0 Response to "How Was The Makeup Of The Senate Changed After The 17th Amendment"

Post a Comment

Subscribe to: Post Comments (Atom)

Iklan Atas Artikel

Iklan Tengah Artikel 1

Iklan Tengah Artikel 2

Iklan Bawah Artikel